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.By CYRus E. WOODS.
THE NEED VOR REVISION OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEGISLATIVE BILLS.
ON the third day of November in the year of our Lord
one thousaid eight .hundred and seventy-three, there was
adopted at Philadelphia the Constitution of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania; With a view of restricting the
legislative power, which without constitutional restriction'
would be absolute, it contained certain provisions whereby
the exercise of that power was limited, and to which it was
confined. Among these provisions special or local legis-
lation, as such, was practically prohibited by the wide and
general range of subjects from which it was debarred, and
the form of bills, and the manner in which they should be
presented and considered, was provided for. The only
constitutidnal provision for this consideration of bills,
however, was to prohibit their passage without reference
to some committee of the legislature itself, no provision
being made for the assistance of that committee by
specialists trained in the formation of laws,' or by persons
qualified to pass upon the subjects to which the bills
under consideration related. No means were provided by
the constitution itself, or have been provided by subsequent
legislation, whereby the legislature in its consideration of
bills might receive information by which it could aive at a
just and intelligent estimate of their character, and of the
legal significance of the form and language in which they
were expressed. As a result bills have been passed without
regard to, or even the knowledge of, existing laws, or of
conflicting bills which were even then pending in the
legislative body. Bills expressed in language so compli-
cated and confusing as to necessitate an explanation and
interpretation from the Supreme Court, before they could
be safely acted upon have become laws, and the courts have
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been burdened by passing ifpon the constitutionality of
laws, the constitutionality of which shofild never have
come before them at all, if the legislature had been in
possession of information regarding them upon which they
could have acted intelligently.
Some ten years ago the American Bar Association
ended their deliberations upon this subject, by passing the
following resolution:
Resolved, That in view of the growing evil of hasty
and ill-considered legislation, and of defective phraseology
in the statute law, this Association recommends the adop-
tion by the several States, of a permanent system by which
the important duty of revising and maturing the acts intro-
duced.into the legislatures shall be entrusted to competent
officers, either by the creation of special commissions or
committees of revision,. or by devolving the duty uponI the
Attorney General of the State."
Some of the States have already taken steps in the
direction thus suggested. Pennsylvania has not, and the
necessity for her action in the matter can well be shown
by ,a reference to two of the bills passed by her, last
legislature.
The Corporation Act of 29th April, 1874, provided a
general scheme for the formation of corporations. The
second section contained a list of the purposes for which
corporations might be organized. By a later act of 17th
April, 1876, this entire section was amended and re-enacted,
increasing the number of purposes for which corporations
might be formed.. By various later acts passed from time
to time the right of incorporation has been extended to
.include corporations organized for various other purposes
not included in the act of 29 th April, 1874, as amended by
the act of 17th April, 1876. Most if not all of these
amendments have been put in the form of a re-enactment,
not of the entire § 2, which contained all of the purposes
for which corporations could be organized, but in the form
of a re-enactment of the particular sub-section of § 2,
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in which the new class of corporations would properly
belong."
By the act of ioth June, 1893, an amendment of the
act of April 17th, 1876, was made, by which drainage com-
panies were added to the list of corporations authorized.
The draughtsman of the act undertook to make this amend-
ment by a re-enactment of the entire § 2 of the act of 17th
April, 1876. In doing so, he forgot to include the amend-
ments subsequent to that act, and re-enacted the section
with the, single addition of drainage companies, with the
result that he has either repealed all the amendments sub-
sequent to the act of iUth April, 1876, or at least raised
grave doubts as to whether they are still in operation.
These amendments are of great importance. They are:
F.irsl.-Act of 8th May, 1889, P. L. 136, providing for
the incorporation and regulation of electric light, heat and
power companies.
Second.-Act of i6th May, 1889, P. L. 24i, authoriz-
ing the incorpordtion of companies for the purpose. of the
purchasing of copyrights for books, publications and regis-
tered trade-marks with the right to issue license for the
same and receive pay therefor.
Third.-Act of 16th May, 1889, P. L., 226, authorizing
the incorporation of companits for the ptirpose of the sup-
ply, storage or transportation of water and water power for
commercial and manufacturing purposes.
Fourth.-Act of 3d June, 1893, P. L. 287, authorizing
the incorporation of companie for the manufacture and
production of silver-ware, plated-ware, jewelry, works of
ornament and art, and pictures, and the buying and selling
of such articles.
The act of June io, 1893, is so carelessly drawn that
the G6vern or, in affixing his signature to it, says: "I have
given my approval to this bill. notwithstanding certain
clumsiness and carelessness on the part of the transcribing
clerks, by which, in the copy presented for my signature,
certain paragraphs in the re-enacting clauses have been un-
necessarily repeated. In the copy as prepared for my ap-
proval, the first seven classes of corporations not for profit,
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and the twenty-fourth, have betn written into the bill in
addition to such re-enactments as were required. The real
purpose of the bill, viz.: To provide for the incorporation
of sewer and drainage companies, is one which meets my
approval, and I, therefore, have affixed my signature to the
bill, notwithstanding the defects to which I call attention,
and which can do no greater harm than to disfigure the
statute books. None the less, the existence of them reflects
on the competency of the transcribing clerks, if not on the
strict attention to duty reasonably expected of the commit-
tees to compare bills. The condition of this and some
other bills submitted to me, with like defects, affords addi-
tional ground for condemnation of the usual procedure of.
passing bills with undue haste and recklessness during the
closing days of the session."
Of course, the Supreme Court may hold the act of
iofl June, 1893, to be uncoiistitutional, or that it is simply
to be read-in place of the act of 17th April, 1876, iand to have
no effect on the other suppleihents of the act of 1874, but
an examination of the act. itself will convince any lawyer -
of the difficulties in his path to logically maintain such
position. Even if he does accomplish the desired result, it.
will take months, and possibly years of litigation and con-
fusion and uncertainty, before the question is 'finally de-.
termnined.
The legislature seems to have created equal confusion
and uncertainty in the Marriage License Act of 93 d June,
1885. Section i of that act provides that from and after
October I, 1885, no person within this commonwealth shall
be joined in marriage until a license shall have been- ob-
tained for that purpose, and the remaining sections only
prescribe the method of obtaining the license thus required,
and the manner of registering it. The Act of ist May, 1893, -
which became immediately operative, amends Section i of
the act of 1.885, and substitutes therefor a new section, to
the effect that on and after October I, 1895, no person
within this commonwealth shall be joined in marriage
until a license shall have been obtained, etc. The act of
1885, as it now stands, would, therefore, seem to indicate
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that am, arriage license should not be required in Pennsyl-
vania from May i, 1893, until October i, 1895, or at lfast
to create a very grave doubt as to its requirement.
In view of the legislation enacted by the last session
-of our legislature, examples of which have been herein
given, to say nothing of that enacted at sessions prior
thereto, the necessity for Pennsylvania .to adopt a* system
by which the important duty of revising and maturing the
acts introduced into the legislature must be evident.
Philadelphia.
tf
'CIVIL LIBERTY AND A WRITTEN. CONSTITUTION.'
III.
The Reasonableness of that Canon of Constitutional Inter-
fprlation which would Prohibit a Legislature from Pass-
ing Any Law Contrary to the Fundamental Prindpbles
of Natural Justice, Unless the Law is Shown to be
Expressly Authoried by the Constitution.
I
WE have shown in the EDITOmiAL NoTEs for October
that this canon was one which was adopted by CHAsE
and STORY, by KENT, WEBSTER and MARSHA'LL, and prac-
tically all the earlier lights of our constitutional law. Yet
there remain two things more:
First, The reasonableness of sufifiosing that the pieople
when they adopht a written constitution, and establish a govern-
ment, and give to the legislature all legislative )bower, did
not intend to give them anyfpower to transgress "fundamen-
" talfprincibles of natural justice."
Second, The wisdom or reasonableness of giving into
the hands of a body of men called judges the right to decide
the question whether any barticular law transgresses the
"pirinciples of natural jvstice."
On both these heads we know no better exposition of
the negative side of the argument than that contained in
I Commenced in the August number, p. 782; continued in the Octo-
ber issue, p. 971. To be concluded by RIcHARD C. MCMURTRIB, LL.D.,
in the December number.
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the two articles of Mr. MCMURTRIE.'l His ,argumeit on
the first point, namely, that those who adopted our con-
stitution intended to confer on their legislature all powers
not expressly taken away, can best be put in his own
words. He says :2 "That men, at the time of the adoption
- of the Federal Constitution, believed- in the power of State.
legislatures, unless restrained by the constitutions they
were framing, Federal or State, to do much mischief,
injustice and iniquity, cannot be disputed. Else why do
we find them putting a muzzle on the power to murder by
act of Assembly; to rob by statute; to convert innocence
into crime, and punish it as such by the same laW? The "
power of the legislature to do these things was believed ii'
when our constitution prohibited attainders and ex Post
facto laws, and compelled compensation for the taking bf.
private property for public purp6ses."
The argument' is strong. Is it conclusive? Bills of
Rights aie now inserted in State constitutions largely out
of habit. Habit also has prescribed exactly what shall go
into a Bill of Rights. For this reason we know of no State.
coilstitution which expressly prohibits in -so many words
the taking of private property for a private purpose witlh or
without compensation, though every citizen on a mo-.
ment's reflection would admit that this was more impor--'
taut than that private property should not be taken for a
public purpose except after compensation.
If these bills of rights are at present inserted from
habit, does the existence of bills of rights in the earliest
constitutions prove anything concerning what the legisla-
ture otherwise had power to do ? When first inserted, a
bill of rights was a natural result of ideas concerning the
dignity of man and human liberty, which then filled all the
pamphlets of the time-and the world was full of pamphlets
-on, man; and government, and society. When first
adopted, they were rather declarations 6f the nature of
1 The first in the January number of the present year, 32 AmERICAN
LAw REGISTER AND REVIEW, I. The second in the June number, 32
AMERICAN LAV REGISTER AND REVIEW, 594.
"2 Supra, p. 3.
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government and the rights of man than impassable barriers
to legislative power. -They were great truths, binding on
the conscience of the legislature, but which, like other
bands of a similar nature, were not of iron, and easily broken
by an act of the legislature. An act which really trampled
on principles of justice was, nevertheless, a law to be
respected by the courts, however, much the individual
."ipight. feel free in breaking it, and by force asserting his
"inalienable rights." Inalienable rights meant rights
from which no man could part, and to protect which he
was justified in resisting any authority, no matter how
ancient .or respectable. When people took oaths to sup-
port the constitution, the Bill of Rights was evidence to
('.'them that they'did not break their oaths when they refused
to obey. laws which affected what they considered their
ifalienable rights. . Every patriot in the last days of the
:revolution probably considered that he was his own judge
* as to what.were these inalienable rights. The Bill of Rights
- in his State constitution was to him a gospel which he
himself must interpret.
To whom the idea first occurred that the courts were
places where the constitutionality of an act could be dis-
cussed will probably never be finally decided. It was hailed
-with joy by all who desired to build up a reign of law, and
therefore more especially by the Federalist judges. For it
was evident that JEIFERSON'S wish for a revolution every
ten years to water the tree of.liberty would come true if
each man was his own judge as to what law he would or
would not obey. And it was probably JE1FERSo1N's ignor-
ance of the then new and still disputed doctrine that a
court could set aside a law for unconstitutionality that led
him to that rash quasi-approval of Shay's rebellion. There
is some force in the argument that, if the legislature
cannot be kept to the -fundamental principles of individ-
ual liberty by the judiciary. how else, except by revolution,
is that liberty to be preserved?
If the ideas concerning the power of a court to set
aside a law for unconstitutionality had become prevalent
before the adoption of Bills of Rights, then there might be
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some force in the argument that unless the people thought
the legislattire could "kill by act of Assembly ' they
would not have put in the prohibition against bills of
attainder. But when we realize that these Bill9 of Rights
were originally nothing but a declaration of the proper
principles which govern legislation, then surely no such "
conclusion could be drawn from their insertion.
But when once the courts had brought themselves to
the position of declaring an act of the legislature void,
then they at once put themselves in the place of the indi-
vidual citizen as an interpreter and defender of his in-
alienable rights." What these rights were are partly
expressly stated in the different "Bills of Rights." But
there was no reason why "Bills of Rights" should contain
the alpha and omega of civil liberty. Not originally
adopted as express restraints on the legislature because
none were thought possible, but rather, as declarations of
the spirit which should actuate legislation,' there were
many rights, as KENT said, "dear alike to freedom and ,to
justice," which were not -expressly mentioned. As faIr as
people thought they could check their legislature they
had done so. The ideas of the time absolved all *nen
from allegience to the laws of a legislature which trans-
gressed fundamental principles of justice. Once the court
undertook to hold the legislatire to their constitutional
powers, they assumed- the responsibility of defending any
interference with individual rights. It is out of the ques--
tion to suppose that men just successful in throwing off a
foreign power, full of the ideas which were then agitating
French social life to the core, would have voluntarily given
to the legislature power to trample on every civil right.
True, they did not seg how the legislature could be
restrained, and they had to content themselves with a
general declaration of the nature of government. But
when once the court had solved this last problem, it was
necessary to say that any law which trangressed, the prin-
ciples of justice, i. e., which would have, according to the
theoretic ideas of the times, warranted a revolution to
resist, was unconstitutional, because the legislature had
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never been granted that power. That the power to trample
upon individual rights had never been granted everybody
admitted, the innovation was the power of the court and
not of the legislature.to decide what was an act contrary to
"the fundamental principles of natural justice."
,* This last brings us to the second question. If the
terms, "the fundamental principles of natural justice" are
simply "high-sounding phrases," incapable of exact defin-
ition, and conveying no complete concept; if, in other words,
they simply mean very' inexpedient or very unwise, then,
as Mr., McMuRTRIE says, because a man happens to write
the word " jfidge" after his name instead of "senator,"
this does not make the act of passing on such a question
any the less al act of legislation, instead of a judicial
decision. "If the folly or injustice or the wisdom of the
law is a ground for refusing obedience, it is'clear the
judiciary are :by the constitution made part of the legisla-
ture, and perform a function in its very nature legislative."'
, - There is much force in this position, and yet would it
not apply equally to all judicial consideration of the con-
stitutionality of legislative acts ? Our Federal courts decide
what is and what is not a law dealing with interstate
commerce. The meaning of the words in the constitution
"commerce betweei the States" has received the most
minute examination, and, as a result, the expanded defini-
tion would cover many pages., It is true that things
which Congress -or a State legislature cannot do are not
expressly set forth in the constitution. It is contended
that they are found in those great charters of, human
liberty, such as Magna Charta and the Declaratiofi of
Independence. So, also, the power -of Congress to estab-
lish a bank is not set forth in so many words, and yet
'Chief Justice MARSHALL upheld the national bank on the
ground that it was necessary and proper to carry out the
powers of the national government. Whether it is more
difficult to decide what is a "necessary and proper power"
than what are the fundamental principles of individual
'Supra, p. 595.
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liberty we leave others to discuss. Mr. McMURTRIE him-
self, in his able plea for the "legal tender notes,"'I gives
proof that the terms "necessary and proper" are not inca-
pable of exact definition, yet that does not cause him to
declare that the court has no powef to lay down broad
principles on the subject.
The best proof, however, that it is possible for one to
lay down with tolerable exactness the powers which it will
not be presumed that a legislature has been granted, except
it be expressly so stated in the constitution, is found in the
opinion of Mr. Justice CHASE, in the case of Calder v. Bull.'
As previously quoted, Mr. Justice CHASE says : " A law that
punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other
words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no
existing law, a law that destroys or impairs the lawful private
contracts of citizens, a law that makes a man a judge in his
own case, or a law that takes private property froni A and
gives it to B (is unconstitutional). It is against reason and
justice for a people to entrust a legislature with such powers,
and therefore they will not- be presumed to have done it."
All his views as to unconstitutional laws here ex-
pressed may not be the ones ultimately adopted, but the
opinion is a proof that the "high-sounding phrases of the
Declaration of Independence" had as exact and definite a
meaning to his mind as the words "interstate commerce"
have to ours, and that in applying these principles to an
act to see if it was contrary to what he called "natural
justice," he would be applying, not his own opinions as to
what was unwise, but fixed principles of law.
We must acknowledge, however, that if anything
could convince us of the. impossibility of developing a con-
stitutional law which will relate to the civil liberty of the
individual, it would be some of the expressions of those
whom we follow in thinking that the legislature has not all
power except where expressly denied. Thus, in Godcharles
I Plea for Supreme Court, observations on Mr. Geo. Bancroft's plea
for the constitution, i881.
2 3 Dall., 386 (1798).
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and Company v,. Wigeman,' the Supreme Court of the
State of Pennsylvania decided that the legislature could
not prescribe that wages should be paid in money and not
in store orders, because it interfered with the free right of
contract. We echo Mr. McMuRTRIE in the criticism on this
case and say: "The spectacle of a government that cannot
prohibit a contract merely because two grown persons desire
to make it, is so utterly absurd as to be quite beyond /the
region of discussion if government of any kind is to con-
tinue." In Budd v. New York,' the power of a govern-
ment to regulate prices was impliedly denied by the
majority, ahid fiercely denied by the minority, principally
because the paternal theory of government was odious to
the judges.3
All this seems to be an attempt to make theories of
government, held by only a part of our people, part of our
constitutional law. Constitutional law, in 'so far as it
pertains to the. civil rights and immunities of the indi-
vidiial, was wisely left by our forefathers to those principles
which all parties professed to believe, and only trans-
gressed in moments of political excitement. Had they
attempted to fasten the particular ideas of a single party
concerning the proper scope of governmental activity,
judges would long ago have found it impossible to uphold
the constitution. It is not that Mr. Justice BREWER, or
other able men, cannot promulgate any exact principles of
what the legislature, unless expressly permitted by the
constitution, can or cannot do-principles that could be
applied by the courts just as any other legal principles are
applied-but that they tend to add other restraints on the
legislature than those which it is either reasonable to expect
- that those who adopted the constitution wished to place or
in which it is wise that any legislature at the present time
should be restrained.
In other words, we must take issue with Mr. McMuR-
113 Pa. St., 431 (I886).
2 145 U. S., 517 (1892).
3 See on the regulation of prices an article entitled. " Can Prices be
Regulated by Law?" Supra, p. 1g, January number.
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